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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioner/appellee Sonia Kelley (hereinafter "Sonia") accepts the statement of issues 
set forth in the Brief of Appellant, except that, as to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-1-4.5(2), a further issue is whether the trial court's finding of unconstitutionality should 
be sustained upon the alternative ground that the cited statute violates article I, § 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. The trial court's determination on this issue is reviewed for correctness. 
Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The Court's interpretation of the following Constitutional provisions and statutes 
may be determinative of this appeal: 
UTAH CONST., art. I, § 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself 
. or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
UTAH CONST., art. I, § 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1998) ("Validity of Marriage Not Solemnized,") 
which provides: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
2 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year 
following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 3-3-5 (Supp. 1999), which provides, in pertinent part: 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor 
children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned 
or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any 
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with 
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Subsection (7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of 
living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of 
alimony for a longer period of time. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were originally divorced on July 18, 1994. On June 14, 1996, Sonia 
filed a motion to set aside the divorce, alleging that Respondent/Appellant Wayne Kelley 
(hereinafter "Wayne") had fraudulently induced her into seeking the divorce; and that 
following the divorce the parties continued to live as man and wife until April, 1996, 
when they separated. On July 10, 1996, Sonia filed a common-law divorce action, 
alleging the existence of a common-law marriage under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, and 
seeking support and alimony in higher amounts than those awarded her in the first 
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divorce action. She also moved the Court to modify the original decree of divorce, as an 
alternative method of relief if her motion to set aside the original divorce decree should 
be denied. 
In the court below, Commissioner Dillon recommended to the trial judge that 
certain statements made by Judge Allphin at a hearing on October 11, 1996, constituted 
an adjudication that the parties had entered into a common law marriage pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 31-1-4.5. The court rejected that recommendation and determined that 
Sonia had failed to achieve an adjudication of the common law marriage issue prior to 
expiration of the one year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Ann. §30-1-
4.5(2). The trial court also rejected Soma's argument that the limitations provision 
violated Article I, Section 11 (the "open courts" provision) of the Utah Constitution, but 
held, sua sponte, that Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) violated Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution. Thus, the trial court found that the parties entered into a common law 
marriage which commenced immediately following their first divorce on July 18, 1994, 
and which terminated at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this case. 
(Conclusions of Law 2, R. at 1670.) 
The trial court also dismissed Soma's fraud claims and, based upon a change of 
circumstances and also upon the common law marriage of the parties, awarded her 
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alimony of $3,000.00 per month, awarded child support, divided property, and awarded 
attorney fees of $35,951.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were originally married on May 24, 1980. Wayne was the founder and 
owner of Altex Construction in Alaska, involved in work on the DEW line and other 
government contracts. (Findings of Fact No. 3, R. at 1660.) In 1990, DSI was formed 
and Wayne owned 55 percent of its stock. DSI was involved in worldwide construction 
of government facilities and modification of government facilities to insulate them from 
terrorism. (Findings of Fact No. 4, R. at 1660.) Wayne proposed that the parties enter 
into a divorce ("the first divorce") so that the family home could be placed in his wife's 
name to protect it from potential creditors. However, he represented to Sonia that the 
parties were not going to be separated and nothing would change from how they had lived 
before. (Findings of Fact No. 9, R. at 1661.) The parties were legally divorced on July 
18, 1994, but the first divorce was only a legal fiction designed to insulate the family 
residence from claims of creditors. (Findings of Fact No. 10, R. at 1661.) Following the 
first divorce, there was no change in the relationship of the parties and in their living 
arrangements. Title to the Kodiak property was not transferred, the parties continued to 
maintain a joint checking account, and they filed a joint income tax return for 1994. 
(Findings of Fact No. 17, R. at 1664.) 
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In the first divorce, Sonia was awarded custody of the parties' minor children, as 
well as the house and furnishings. Wayne retained his stock in DSI and was also awarded 
the parties' investment property in Kodiak, Alaska, which was generating income to him 
of $10,000.00 per month. At the time of the divorce, DSI listed considerable assets and 
had a book value of $1,134,828.09, and Wayne was receiving a draw from DSI in the 
amount of $8,000.00 per month. Wayne was required to pay alimony of $1,000.00 per 
month and child support in the same amount. (Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12, 14 and 16, R. 
at 1662-1663.) 
In July, 1994 — the same month the parties were supposedly divorced — they 
appeared at a counseling class and told the counselor that the divorce was only for 
business purposes and that their children would never know the parties were divorced. 
They continued to socialize together, attended a Christmas party together in December, 
1994, and otherwise held themselves out as a married couple. No one in the community 
was told of the divorce at that time. (Findings of Fact No. 18, R. at 1664.) In May, 
1995, Wayne sent Sonia an anniversary card in which he indicated he loved her and a 
wish for another 15 years. (Findings of Fact No. 20, R. at 1665.) The parties continued 
to cohabit, and Wayne maintained all of his personal property at the marital residence. 
They held themselves out to their children as married, and Wayne provided Sonia with 
money from which she serviced their joint debts. (Findings of Fact No. 27, R. at 1666.) 
7 
In the fall of 1995, Sonia became suspicious that Wayne was involved with 
another woman. Wayne told Sonia that this other relationship was over, and the parties' 
relationship was reestablished. (Findings of Fact No. 23, R. at 1665.) In the spring of 
1996, however, Sonia learned that Wayne's relationship with the other woman was 
continuing, and a subsequent altercation resulted in the police being called and criminal 
charges being filed against Wayne. Subsequently, Sonia filed actions including a 
Petition to Modify and pleadings setting forth theories of a common law marriage and 
fraud. (Findings of Fact No. 25, R. at 1665.) She also filed a divorce complaint (July 10, 
1996). 
The trial court found that there was no fraud or misrepresentation in connection 
with the first divorce in 1994 (Findings of Fact No. 26, R. at 1665), but the first divorce 
was a "non-traditional divorce" which created a legal fiction only. (Findings of Fact No. 
10, R. at 1662.) 
Before the trial court, Sonia attempted to conduct discovery on issues involving 
Wayne's and DSI's financial status, but that discovery was resisted by Wayne, ultimately 
resulting in motions to compel and for a bench warrant and sanctions against him. 
(Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Objections to Commissioner's Recommendations, 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 9, R. at 1173.) 
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In 1997, DSI received a net settlement in litigation in the amount of $1,300,000. 
(Findings of Fact No. 28, R. at 1666.) These proceeds were used primarily for the 
purchase of a Mercedes 600SL and the construction of a large residence in Summit 
County, primarily for Wayne's benefit. (Findings of Fact No. 29, R. at 1667.) Further, 
Wayne, who is presently the president of Omega Oil, has received a monthly income 
from that entity of $6,000.00 per month since June, 1996. (Findings of Fact No. 31, R. at 
1667.) Finally, Wayne has manipulated his corporations and his income by taking funds 
through loans and not as income with withdrawals as he has seen fit. Wayne has used the 
assets of these businesses to meet his own living expenses and to purchase property for 
his own interest. (Findings of Fact Nos. 34, 35 R. at 1667.) 
Historically, Wayne has had an income in excess of $10,000 a month with funds 
he received from the Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 from DSL His current 
income of $6,000 a month from Omega Oil is supplemented by funds he has received 
through loans not reflected as income from his various businesses. Consistent with his 
past manipulations, Wayne has manipulated his income to limit the presentation of his 
income before the trial court. (Findings of Fact 36, R. at 1668.) 
Following entry of the court's Decree of Divorce, Wayne failed to pay Sonia any 
alimony from December, 1998, through July 30, 1999. (Findings re Contempt, R. at 
1689.) He also failed to pay other debts and obligations he was ordered to pay pursuant 
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to the Decree of Divorce, namely, child support and the sums owing to Seattle First 
National Bank and Citibank. (Findings re Contempt, 4, 7; R. at 1690.) Accordingly, the 
court held Wayne in contempt. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correctly held that the one-year statute of limitations in Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) violates Article L § 24 of the Utah Constitution. In the 
alternative, that provision violates Article Ir § 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
The statute at issue creates a classification which is wholly arbitrary and should be 
invalidated. Further, the one-year statute of limitations does not further any reasonable 
legislative objective. In the alternative, the statute's inflexible one-year limitations period 
containing no exception for excusable delay is unreasonable and violates the open courts 
provision of the Utah State Constitution. 
II. The trial court made sufficient findings to support its conclusion that the 
parties entered into a common law marriage. 
The fact that one party to a common law marriage enters into a cohabitive 
relationship with another party does not preclude a finding of common law marriage 
between the parties herein. The trial court implicitly determined that Wayne Kelley did, 
in fact, consent to be married, and that finding is not clearly erroneous. Further, the trial 
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court explicitly found that the parties generally held themselves out as husband and wife, 
which establishes the "uniform and general reputation" requirement of the statute. 
III. Any error committed by the trial court in modifying the original Decree of 
Divorce is harmless, because the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering payments 
of child support and alimony in this case. 
The trial court's award of child support and alimony is supportable whether 
viewed as a de novo award based upon the court's findings in this proceeding, or based 
upon a modification of the original Decree of Divorce because of changed circumstances. 
IV. The trial court's award of temporary child support in 1996 is proper as a 
modification of the court's award in the original Decree of Divorce based upon changed 
cirpumstenpe$T 
The trial court's award of temporary alimony and child support was made 
following Soma's petition to modify the decree of divorce, was based upon detailed 
findings of fact, and should be sustained. 
V. The trial court's findings of fact supporting its alimony award should be 
sustained because they were based on the Appellant's historical earning capacity, and the 
Appellant failed to cooperate in discovery which would have revealed the full extent of 
his income. 
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The Appellant, who failed to cooperate in discovery before the trial court, should 
not be permitted to use that failure as a sword to attack the trial court's alimony award. 
VI. The trial court's findings of fact support its award of attorney fees. 
The trial court's findings on the attorney fees issue should be sustained because 
the court implicitly found that Wayne Kelley had the ability to pay those fees, and its 
finding is not clearly erroneous. 
VII. The trial court's contempt findings are supported by the record in this case. 
The trial court's implicit findings that Wayne Kelley had the ability to pay the 
amounts ordered are not clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 30-1-4.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a]U laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) provides that, to be 
recognized, a common law marriage must be judicially or administratively determined 
"during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the 
termination of that relationship." 
While the trial court found the uniform operations clause of the Utah Constitution 
to be somewhat analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984), the court went on to 
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emphasize that simple uniformity of the law is insufficient to pass muster under the Utah 
Constitution. Rather, the critical question is whether the operation of the law in question 
is uniform. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). The trial court concluded that 
the operation of the one year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Ann. §30-1-
4.5(2) was constitutionally infirm because there was no rational basis for discriminating 
between those who could obtain the requisite judicial determination within the one-year 
time period and those who could not. As the trial court pointed out, whether a party may 
succeed in obtaining the required judicial determination within one year is largely a 
matter of chance. If one party vigorously resists such a determination, it is quite likely 
that such a determination can easily be delayed until the one-year limitations period has 
expired. Court caseloads may similarly prevent timely determination. (Ruling on 
Plaintiffs and Defendant's Objections to Commissioner's Recommendations, R. at 1188-
1190; see Brief for Appellant at Addendum A.) Further, an appellate court could 
overturn a decision of common law marriage by the trial court and remand the case for 
further findings, but the final determination could easily come too late. See Bunch v. 
Englehom, 906 P.2d 918, 921 n.3 (Utah App. 1995). 
The problems which may arise are well illustrated by the instant case. The parties' 
relationship finally terminated in April, 1996, almost two full years after their first 
divorce. On July 10, 1996, Sonia filed her common law divorce action and timely 
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asserted that the parties maintained a common law marriage relationship pursuant to law. 
At a hearing on October 11, 1996, Judge Allphin made certain comments regarding the 
parties' relationship, and on September 25, 1997, Commissioner Dillon recommended to 
the trial court that those comments be deemed the required judicial determination of 
common law marriage under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. Wayne objected to that 
recommendation, and the trial court sustained that objection in its ruling of January 28, 
1998. Since it is the timely judicial determination of common law marriage that is 
dispositive, and not the mere raising of the claim, see Bunch v. Englehorn, supra, and 
since no determination was made within one year, the simple vagaries of the judicial 
process leave Sonia Kelley with no remedy, through no fault of her own. Whether she 
could obtain the requisite determination of common law marriage in a timely fashion has 
been left by the law to mere caprice. For this reason, the trial court concluded that "the 
statute's operation is, as set forth in the scenarios above, practically de facto arbitrary." 
(Ruling on Plaintiffs and defendant's Objections to Commissioner's Recommendations, 
R. at 1192, Brief for Appellant, Addendum A.) 
\nAvis v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 
1992), the court found no violation of Article I, § 24, in the context of the three-year 
statute of limitations for filing of claims before the Industrial Commission. The court 
held that the three-year statute of limitations "classifies workers in a reasonable manner 
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in that all injured workers are subject to the same limitations period within which to file a 
claim for compensation." Id at 588. The court also found that the limited time for 
bringing the claim bore "a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a legitimate 
legislative purpose," to "protect the State of Utah . . . from having to defend stale claims." 
Id Avis is distinguishable from the instant case because the one year statute at issue here 
is not reasonably related to any legitimate Legislative purpose. In adopting Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-1-4.5, the Legislative purpose was to "give formal recognition to marriages 
informally entered into in the past." Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793-794 (Utah 1994). 
Because the timely obtaining of the necessary judicial or administrative determination 
within one year is largely a matter of fortuity, the one year statute not only fails to further 
the Legislative purpose, it actively frustrates it. 
But even if the one-year statute of limitations is determined to be valid under 
Article I, Section 24, it fails under the Utah Constitution's "open courts" clause, Article I, 
Section 11. In addressing this issue, the trial court concluded that the "open courts" 
clause was inapplicable because it protects access to the courts only for claims which 
were recognized in the Utah Constitution as it was originally adopted, citing Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp. Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) mdMasich v. United States Smelting, 
Refining & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948). Concluding that Utah did not 
recognize common law marriages at the time the Constitution was adopted, the trial court 
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determined that the one-year statute of limitations at issue here could not violate Article I, 
Section 11. It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's holding represents a 
significant misreading of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., supra. There, in a footnote, the Court noted that "[t]o some extent, therefore, the 
common law at the time of statehood provides at least a measure of the kinds of legal 
rights that the framers must have had in mind for the protection of life, property, and 
liberty." Id. at 676, n.3. In the body of the opinion itself, however, the court stated as 
follows: 
Specifically, neither the due process nor the open courts provision 
constitutionalizes the common law or otherwise freezes the law governing private 
rights and remedies as of the time of statehood, [citation omitted.] It is, in fact, one 
of the important functions of the Legislature to change and modify the law that 
governs relations between individuals as society evolves and conditions require. 
However, once a cause of action under a particular rule of law accrues to a person 
by virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's interest in the cause of action and 
the law which is the basis for a legal action becomes vested, and a legislative 
repeal of the law cannot constitutionally divest the injured person of the right to 
litigate the cause of action to a judgment. 
Id. at 676. Thus, in Berry, the court invalidated under the open courts clause a product 
liability statute of repose which barred actions without regard to when an injury occurred, 
noting that the open courts provision prevents arbitrary deprivation of "effective remedies 
designed to protect basic individual rights." Id. at 675. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that Article I, § 11 has potentially broad application. Horton v. Goldminer 's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1093 (Utah 1989). Further, in Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171, 
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1183 (Utah 1999), the Court made clear that Article I, § 11, protects rights to recover for 
personal injury or common law remedies existing at any time, and not just those rights 
existing at the time of Utah statehood: 
The proposition that the rights protected by [Article I, § 11] are defined by the law 
as it existed in 1896 has been rejected in a number of opinions of this Court, both 
expressly and implicitly, in part because it has no textual basis, would tend to 
freeze the law at a particular point in time and thereby subvert the normal and 
necessary evolution of the law as times change, and would otherwise improperly 
interfere with legislative perogatives. 
In a footnote, the Court disapproves of the language in Ross v. Schackel 920 P.2d 1159 
(Utah 1996), to the contrary, conceding that Ross "sounded a discordant note." Day at 
1188, n. 10. 
In Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993), the Court of Appeals 
invalidated a three-month statute of limitations on seeking habeas corpus relief, finding 
(1) that the statute did not substantially advance the Legislative purpose of deterring serial 
filings by perennial petitioners; and (2) that the inflexibly short limitations period, 
without any exception for excusable delay, was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional 
under the open courts provision. In Currier, the appellants argued that the three-month 
limitation unreasonably curtailed their constitutional right to seek a civil remedy in state 
court. Suggesting that Article I, § 11 applies equally to statutes of limitations as to 
statutes of repose, the Court of Appeals noted that its analysis of 
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the open courts provision invokes the specific analytical framework developed by 
the [Utah] Supreme Court to structure section 11 review. This two part test first 
inquires into whether a statute abrogating an existing remedy provides "an 
effective and reasonable alternative remedy/' and second, if no alternative remedy 
is provided, examines whether the statute eliminates "a clear social or economic 
evil" through means that are not unreasonable or arbitrary." Berry, 111 P.2d at 
680; see also Horton, 785 P.2d at 1094; Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 358. 
Currier, 862 P.2d at 1363. The Court of Appeals also identified two supplemental 
factors it found relevant to its analysis: (1) the degree to which a statute impairs an 
individual's right to seek a remedy; and (2) the nature of the right impaired. Id. In 
analyzing the impairment issue, the court criticized statutes of repose because they are 
not designed to provide a reasonable time in which to file an action, and concluded that 
such statutes "constitute a significant impairment of the right to seek remedy in state 
court." Id. By way of contrast, the court concluded that statutes of limitation "do not 
present a degree of impairment comparable to that created by statues of repose" because 
"a statute of limitations only begins to run from the time that a cause of action accrues or 
after the violation of a legal right." Id In the instant case, the one-year statute of 
limitations is unique in that its expiration is not necessarily dependent on any act of the 
party claiming the benefits of common law marriage, but is determined wholly by the 
efficiency of the legal process itself, without regard to the diligence of that party. 
Consequently, the degree to which the statute impairs an individual's right to seek the 
remedy of an adjudication of common law marriage must be deemed high. Further, like 
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the invalidated statute in Currier, the statute at issue here is wholly inflexible and 
contains no exceptions for excusable delay. 
The Currier court imposed a heightened degree of scrutiny on the statute of 
limitations in that case because the right of habeas corpus was deemed fundamental. Id. 
at 1364. While marriage itself may be just such a fundamental right justifying strict 
scrutiny, see Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n. 3 
(1976), the right at issue here is not the right to marry but the right to have one's common 
law marriage adjudicated. The trial court held that such a right was in the nature of an 
economic or social interest which is reviewed under the lesser "rational basis" standard. 
But even under that lesser standard, as the trial court noted, courts in Utah have been "far 
less willing [than federal courts] to find that legislative classifications underlying 
economic regulations are reasonable." Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah 1988). 
In Lee v. Gaufm, 867 P.2d 572, 583 (Utah 1993), the Court held that a statutory 
classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected right to a 
remedy for personal injury under Article I, § 11, is constitutional only if it (1) is 
reasonable; (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective 
and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is 
reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. The one-year statute of 
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limitations provided in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) meets none of these tests, and 
should be held unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution's open courts provision. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT MADE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO SUPPORT ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A COMMON LAW 
MARRIAGE. 
To establish a common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, a 
court or administrative order must establish that a relationship arises out of a contract 
between to consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife. 
The Appellant maintains that the findings of the trial court fail to adequately 
address the consent and cohabitation requirements. In addition, the Appellant suggests 
that the trial court gave inadequate consideration to the extent that the parties acquired a 
general reputation as husband and wife. Each of these contentions is without merit. 
Preliminarily, the trial court's findings of fact are subject to a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). A finding of 
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fact is clearly erroneous only when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991). To 
successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact, the Appellant must demonstrate that 
they are clearly erroneous by marshalling all of the evidence in support of those findings, 
then demonstrating that those findings are not supported by legally sufficient evidence. 
Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah App. 1995); Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 
818 (Utah App. 1992). This the Appellant has failed to do. 
Notably, the Appellant does not dispute any of the trial court's findings directly, 
but argues only that the court should have considered other evidence. That Wayne 
consented to the common law marriage arrangement is demonstrated by the lack of any 
change in his living arrangements after the first divorce in 1994. Wayne neglected to 
transfer title to the marital residence to Sonia until after the second divorce action was 
filed. Wayne continued to maintain a joint checking account with Sonia. Wayne filed a 
joint income tax return with Sonia in 1994. Wayne continued to cohabit and have sexual 
relations with Sonia. Wayne never told his children about any changes in his relationship 
with Sonia. (Findings of Fact 17, R. at 1664.) Wayne continued to socialize with Sonia. 
Wayne continued to hold himself out as married to Sonia. Wayne failed to tell anyone in 
the community about the first divorce. (Findings of Fact 18, R. at 1664.) Wayne sent 
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Sonia an anniversary card after the first divorce indicating he loved her and wishing for 
another 15 years together. (Findings of Fact 20, R. at 1664.) 
The term "cohabitation" is not defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, and does not 
lend itself to a universal definition. Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 674 (Utah 1985) 
(Hall, J., dissenting.) In one domestic case, the Utah Supreme Court defined the term as 
"to dwell together in a common residence and to participate in sexual contact that 
evidences a larger conjugal relationship." Id. The Appellant frankly acknowledges that 
there was testimony in this case to the effect that the parties had continuing sexual 
contact, but argues that the fact he was spending most of his time in Texas in a 
relationship with another woman "negates any implication that the parties were residing 
together." (Brief of Appellant, p. 18.) The trial court found, however, that during their 
marriage Wayne's business "required him to be away from home for extended periods," 
and that "[b]ecause of the nature of his work, he was home intermittently, was gone for 
long periods of time on a regular basis and was very seldom home on a long-term 
continuous basis." (Findings of Fact 5, R. at 1660.) Thus, the extent of his time in Texas 
is not determinative of the cohabitation issue. Rather, his long absences from the family 
home was consistently the same both before the first divorce and during the term of the 
common law marriage. It may be, as Appellant suggests, that the concept of a common 
residency implies "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
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principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time/' Sigg v. Sigg, 905 
P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995), but the fact that the Appellant retained all of his personal 
belongings in the family residence (Findings of Fact No. 27, R. at 1666) where his wife 
and children resided strongly suggests he viewed that home as the common abode of the 
parties. 
Finally, there was abundant evidence that the parties had a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife in the community. While it is true that there was some 
conflict in the evidence presented at trial on this issue, it is apparent that the trial judge 
simply resolved that conflict in favor of Sonia. Where a trial judge resolves a conflict in 
the evidence in favor of one party, its determination in this respect will not be disturbed 
on appeal. Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Spanish Fork South Irrigation Co., 153 
P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1944); Smith v. Industrial Commision, 140 P.2d 314 (Utah 1943). 
The Appellant has simply failed to demonstrate that the findings of the trial court 
are clearly erroneous. 
III. ANY ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN MODIFYING 
THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE IS HARMLESS, BECAUSE THE 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING PAYMENTS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court, finding a change in circumstances since the first divorce, and also 
based upon its finding that the parties were subsequently married at common law, 
modified the terms of the original Decree of Divorce. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 4 and 5, 
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R. at 1671.) The original Decree was the result of a divorce proceeding entered into by 
the parties for the sole purpose of insulating the family residence from the claims of 
creditors. (Findings of Fact No. 9, R. at 1661.) That Decree awarded child support in the 
amount of $1,000.00 per month and alimony in the same amount. (Findings of Fact No. 
13, R. at 1662.) In fact however, Wayne's practice had been to give Sonia $7,500.00 per 
month to pay bills. (Findings of Fact No. 16, R. at 1663.) Circumstances changed, 
however, in June, 1996, when Wayne terminated all of his financial support. 
(Conclusions of Law No. 4, R. at 1671), and the trial court determined that it was 
appropriate to modify the terms of the first Decree on the basis of that changed 
circumstance and in light of the common law marriage of the parties. (Conclusions of 
Law No. 5,R. at 1671.) 
The Appellant suggests that the trial court's determination to modify the first 
Decree has the effect of a holding that the parties were both married and not married at 
the same time, arguing that if the parties were married at common law then the first 
Decree is presumed to be no longer in force. (Brief for Appellant, p. 21.) 
In making an award of alimony, the trial court must consider (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide 
support. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993). Each of these factors 
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was carefully considered by the trial court. The trial court found, prior to the first 
divorce, the standard of living of the parties was one in which Wayne would give to 
Sonia $7,500.00 a month to pay bills, and that this arrangement existed for a substantial 
period of time. (Findings of Fact No. 16, R. at 1663.) The court further found that the 
monthly mortgage payment on the home awarded to Sonia in the first divorce was 
$400.00 more than the combined support and alimony awarded to Sonia. (Findings of 
Fact No. 15, R. at 1663.) These findings are sufficient to establish Soma's needs. 
On Soma's ability to produce a sufficient income, the trial court found that the 
petitioner had not worked outside of the home for a considerable period of time, was not 
employed, and was not earning any income. (Findings of Fact No. 15, R. at 1663.) 
On Wayne's ability to provide the required support, the trial court found that Wayne 
resisted discovery "on issues involving [his] financial status," and that he "continued to 
resist discovery of his and his corporation's (DSI) financial status," (Ruling on Plaintiffs 
and Defendant's Objections to Commissioner's Recommendations, Findings of Fact Nos. 
7 and 9, R. at 1173-1174.) Consequently, in awarding child support and alimony, the 
trial court relied on Wayne historical earning capacity of approximately $18,000.00 per 
month and expressly found that Wayne "has manipulated his income to limit his income 
presented in this proceeding." (Findings of Fact No. 36, R. at 1668.) In awarding 
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alimony and child support, the trial court was permitted to consider Wayne's historical 
earning capacity. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999.) 
The trial court's determination with respect to alimony and child support will not 
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999). 
In reaching its determination on these issues, the trial court made detailed findings of fact 
and based its award upon those findings. The Court simply concluded that the amounts 
awarded as alimony and child support in the first Decree were inadequate based upon the 
facts elicited at trial in the instant case. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding these amounts, its determination should be sustained. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT IS 
PROPER BECAUSE IT WAS MADE AFTER A HEARING AND AFTER THE 
COURT MADE DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
AWARD, WHICH MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
The Appellant urges that there was no basis for the trial court's 1996 award of 
$6,000 per month in temporary alimony and child support. In its Ruling dated November 
7, 1996, the trial court made detailed findings and determined that Sonia had a need of 
approximately $6,000.00 per month to maintain her expenses and the expenses of her 
minor children and awarded payment of $1,400.00 per month in child support and 
$4,600.00 per month in alimony. (See Ruling attached as Addendum 1, R. at 490-492.) 
The Appellant suggests that the trial court erred in awarding these amounts to 
Sonia because, at the time of the ruling, there was no finding by the court that the parties 
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were married at common law, and that the later finding by the court to that effect was 
erroneous. In fact, however, it is clear that the trial court's award of temporary alimony 
and child support was in response to Soma's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
(July 10, 1996). The trial court made detailed findings concerning Soma's needs and 
Wayne's ability to pay for the support of his family. Those findings are not clearly 
erroneous, and they should be sustained. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTING ITS 
ALIMONY AWARD SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE THEY ARE BASED 
ON THE APPELLANT'S HISTORICAL EARNING CAPACITY, AND THE 
APPELLANT FAILED TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY WHICH WOULD 
HAVE REVEALED THE FULL EXTENT OF HIS INCOME. 
The trial court awarded Sonia $3,000.00 per month in alimony commencing 
December, 1998. In support of that award, the trial court made detailed findings, and 
determined that Wayne "has manipulated his corporations by taking funds through loans 
and not as income with these withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not a traditional method 
of compensation, and the respondent has manipulated his income as he has seen fit." 
(Findings of Fact No. 34, R. at 1668.) Further, Wayne actively resisted discovery in this 
case which would have given the trial court a more accurate picture of his income. 
(Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Objections to Commissioner's Recommendations, 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 9, R. at 1173-1174.) At trial, there was evidence that Wayne 
took substantial advances from DSI for the purpose of constructing a home in Park City 
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and purchasing a Mercedes Benz automobile. (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp.48-49.) There was no 
evidence that any such loans were ever repaid by him. DSPs accountant testified that 
there was no "formal agreement" documenting the loan from DSI to Wayne. (Tr. Vol.Ill, 
p. 67.) Further, after March, 1996, Wayne stopped maintaining a personal checking 
account (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 194), and thus no banking paper trail of his financial activities 
was available. As to the Mercedes Benz, Wayne acknowledged in his deposition that DSI 
purchased the car for him "as a bonus for a piece of litigation that we assumed that we 
were going to settle." (Deposition of Wayne Kelley, November 14, 1998, p. 10; R. at 
1725.) During 1996, Wayne further acknowledged that he received $8,000.00 a month as 
compensation from DSI. and, between January and June, 1997, had income as a 
consultant for Petrotech Resources. (Deposition of Wayne Kelley, November 14, 1998, 
p.53-54.) Although Wayne testified at trial that he had expenses of $10,500 a month, the 
trial court found that a substantial portion of those expenses related to the Park City 
home, which was to be sold. (Conclusions of Law No. 10, R. at 1675.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony in this case and its 
decision should be affirmed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
As noted above, the trial court found that Wayne "manipulated his income as he 
has seen fit" through the mechanism of loans from corporations he controlled. (Findings 
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of Fact No. 34, R. at 1668.) The trial court also noted that "there has been certain 
obstreperous conduct on the part of respondent with respect to discovery, making it 
difficult to process and prosecute this action." (Finding of Fact No. 41, R. at 1669.) 
Because of this, the trial court was required to make its determinations based upon 
Wayne historical earning capacity, and the Appellant does not argue that the Court erred 
in determining that historical earning capacity. Essentially, Wayne now urges the court 
to reverse the trial court's findings when any deficiencies therein have been exacerbated 
by his own lack of cooperation in discovery. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
trial court's reliance on Wayne's historical earnings in assessing Wayne's ability to pay 
attorney fees is not clearly erroneous and should be sustained by the court. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTEMPT FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE. 
Here, the Appellant again faults the trial court for allegedly failing to make 
sufficient findings of Wayne's income and relying instead on his historical earning 
capacity. The trial court found that Wayne "has voluntarily chosen to stay with Omega 
Oil in which he has an interest and thereby reduce his income from the possibility of 
grater income." (Findings of Fact re: Contempt, No. 4, R at 1690.) The trial court is 
permitted to consider whether Wayne is underemployed. Hill v. Hill 867 P.2d 963, 965-
66 (Utah App. 1994). Although Wayne offered testimony at his contempt hearing 
concerning his current employment situation, it is clear that the trial court chose not to 
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believe that testimony and instead chose to rely upon Wayne's historical earning capacity 
in determining whether he had the means to pay child support and alimony. The trial 
court's findings are not clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial judge should be sustained 
with respect to each of the issues on appeal. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is required pursuant to Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(l 1). 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2000. 
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